by Michael Kramer
On December 16, 2012, a 23-year-old
woman and her 28-year-old male friend were riding a bus in New Delhi when they were
kidnapped and beaten by a group of young men.
The woman was gang-raped. The two (who remain
publicly unidentified for legal reasons) were left brutalized and naked on a
street in one of the city’s wealthy neighborhoods. Two weeks after the attack, the woman died
from severe internal injuries.
Indian police apprehended six suspects
in the weeks following the crime. Three
of the suspects claim to have been under 18 years old on the date of the attack.
The December 16 attack and subsequent public
response have brought to the forefront a number of problems for India’s
compliance with international human rights norms, especially with regard to
women’s legal protections and the rights of minors. The crime and its fallout have implications
for India’s obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC), and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR).
Insufficient
Legal Protections for Indian Women
Responses to the December 16 crimes
came from a variety of sources inside and outside of India, including from the
international human rights community.
Anne F. Stenhammer, Regional Programme Director for the United Nations
Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) in South
Asia, released a statement on December 20, framing the
issue as one of human rights,
demanding “concrete action and stronger implementation of already existing laws
and regulations” against sexual harassment and violence, and calling for the
Indian government to “take up radical reforms, ensure justice and reach out
with robust public services to make women’s lives more safe and secure.”
The CEDAW, which India ratified in 1993, lays out a primary set of human rights obligations
with regard to legal protections for women.
Article 2 provides in part that parties to the Convention agree “[t]o
establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men
and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other public
institutions the protection of women against any act of discrimination.” Furthermore, Article 15 states that “States
Parties shall accord to women equality with men before the law.”
Legislative
Response Falls Short
In the wake of the December 16 crimes,
the Indian government established a three-person committee, chaired by former
Supreme Court Chief Justice J.S. Verma, to collect ideas and suggestions from
experts and the public, and to produce a set of recommendations for reforming
sexual violence laws. The Verma
Committee’s recommendations included setting maximum punishments for rape at life
imprisonment and not the death
penalty, not lowering the age of majority, and requiring more accountability of
security officers in sexual violence cases.
The Verma Committee placed blame for India’s sexual violence endemic on poor governance, i.e., poor enforcement of laws and not on the quality of legislation
itself.
On February 3, 2013, President Pranab
Mukherjee signed the Criminal Law
(Amendment) Ordinance, 2013,
a new law amending sexual violence laws.
The law does not accord with many of the Verma Committee’s
recommendations, as it sets the death penalty as the maximum punishment for
rape, and maintains legal immunities for police and armed forces in sexual
violence cases.
A number of human rights watchdog
groups, including Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch, have called
for the new law to be reformed in accordance with the Verma Committee’s
recommendations and international human rights law. The new law defines crimes of sexual violence
as “insults” or “outrages” to a woman’s “modesty” instead of crimes against her
right to bodily integrity. Such a
definition seems to treat a woman’s right to bodily inviolability as different
from a man’s right solely on the basis of gender, and presents facial contravention
of Articles 2 and 15 of the CEDAW.
Additionally, the new law does not
recognize marital rape, making it so that women can bring sexual assault
charges against her husband only in the narrow circumstance where she lives
apart from him and is legally separated from him. This lack of acknowledgement challenges
Article 1 of the CEDAW, which prohibits “any distinction, exclusion, or
restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of
impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women… of
human rights and fundamental freedoms…”
The Indian Parliament passed another anti-rape
law on March 21. The new legislation for the first time
expressly outlaws stalking, voyeurism, acid attacks, and forcibly undressing a
woman. It raises the minimum sentence
for gang rape and rape by a police officer from 10 years to 20 years, and provides
capital punishment for rapes that result in death. Reformers lament provisions in the new
legislation increasing the age of consent from 16 years to 18 years, which they
fear will lead to wrongful arrests. The
new legislation also fails to address marital rape.
Problematic
Age of Majority Reforms and Sentencing Guidelines
One of the suspects in the December 16
crimes claims to have been 17 years old on the date of the attack, and he has turned
18 since then. This situation posed a
problem for the Indian courts: would he be tried as a minor or as an adult
(i.e., as a man older than 18 years)? The
question of whether to charge the suspect as a minor or as an adult
significantly affects the length of his maximum sentence: as a minor, he would
face at most three years in a juvenile reform facility; as an adult, he could
face life in prison. The Indian courts
decided that one of the alleged underage suspects would be tried as a
minor.
Because Indian law restricts the holding of adults in juvenile
facilities, his three-year sentence can possibly be reduced to six months. Five other suspects are undergoing an
expedited trial process and face life imprisonment or the death penalty if
convicted, although two of the suspects, Vinay Sharma and Mukesh Singh, claim that they
are minors.
Sharma’s and Singh’s majority/minority status has yet to be determined,
so the issue of sentencing guidelines is far from moot.
Indian Women and Child Minister Krishna
Tirath has said that the government does not favor lowering the official age of
majority, but the “rarest of rare” cases such as the New Delhi rape call for
stricter punishment.
The possibility that someone would face
life imprisonment for a crime committed as a minor stands in opposition to
India’s international human rights obligations.
Article 37 of the CRC, which India ratified in 1992, states that “Neither capital punishment nor life
imprisonment without the possibility of release shall be imposed for offences
committed by persons below eighteen years of age.” India’s lowering the age of majority to allow
prosecutors to seek life imprisonment and the death penalty for defendants
under the age of 18 would similarly constitute an illegal circumvention of
international human rights law.
Furthermore, Article 6 of the ICCPR, a document which India ratified in 1979, states that the death penalty “may be imposed only
for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of
the commission of the crime...”.
Setting aside the question of whether the December 16 crimes would meet
Article 6’s definition of a “most serious crime,” it would be contrary to
Article 6 for the Indian government to consider making an exception to
established legal procedures to extend death penalty eligibility to a minor.
Part of the problem in identifying the
age of the suspects is India’s inaccurate recordkeeping, which makes
determining the suspects’ exact birthdates difficult. Without an official birth certificate, the
courts relied on the unnamed 18-year-old suspect’s school records—essentially
what information his parents reported to the school—in declaring him a minor at
the time of the attack. The continued
development of India’s administrative infrastructure may help resolve these
problems in the future, but India must also prosecute defendants within the
bounds of international human rights law with respect to life imprisonment and
death penalty sentences.
Treatment
of Prisoners Triggers More Human Rights Concerns
Youth sentencing guidelines are not the
only human rights problems that the December 16 incident has posed for the
Indian criminal justice system. On March
11, Ram Singh, a 33-year-old suspect in the crimes, allegedly hanged himself in his jail
cell at Tihar prison in Delhi. Singh’s family has raised
questions as to whether he actually was murdered
and claims that he was tortured in
prison.
Tihar has seen numerous suicides and murders among its prisoner
population, and has previously been criticized for depriving prisoners of their
rights (e.g., right against torture, right to wholesome food, and right to
medical care) under Indian and international law. Article 10 of the ICCPR dictates that
prisoners “shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent
dignity of the human person.” If the
state was complicit in Singh’s death and torture as his family alleges, the
Indian government should be made to answer for these violations of Article 10.
Absent
Meaningful Reform, Progress Underway on Grassroots Level
It appears that grassroots responses to
the December 16 attack may improve conditions for women in Indian society. Women in New Delhi have organized around the
principle that the streets will be safer if there are more women on the road,
leading to a substantial rise in the
demand for female drivers
in the city. The increased presence of
women on the roads may indeed increase women’s safety. A November 2012 survey supported by UN Women
showed that only 5 percent
of women in New Delhi viewed public spaces as “safe” from sexual violence. The increased
presence of women on the streets may have the secondary effect of achieving
more fundamental steps towards women’s equality, as women increase their
presence in a scene typically dominated by men and at least subtly assert their
equal place in society.
These grassroots efforts toward
equality are encouraging, insofar as they are not a transitory reaction to the
outrageous crimes of December 16. The
move toward reform for sexual violence laws and juvenile sentencing must not conclude
with the December 16 criminal trial (which is ongoing as of the writing of this
article). The inadequacy of India’s
current sexual violence laws, as well as the incompatibility of India’s
sentencing guidelines with respect to minors, warrant popular pressure on Indian
officials for legal reform.